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Is it possible to discern a point at which technology becomes
antithetical to Christian aspirations? Consider the following
vignettes:

H aroesting Organs and Selling Kidneys
On AprilS, 1990, after a 35-day hearing, the General Medical Council found a physician and two surgeons guilty of
serious professional misconduct. Dr. Raymond Crockett, a
physician in private practice in London's Harley Street and at
the National Kidney Centre, was struck off the medical Register, and Mr. Michael Bewick and Mr. Michael Joyce had
restrictions placed on their practice following their involvement in a kidney-for-sale scandal. The case concerned transplant operations with kidneys removed from Turkish donors,
unrelated to the recipients, who had been brought to London
and paid for their organs.
Repairing Brains Using Aborted Fetuses
In January 1994, the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
awarded a grant to study fetal tissue implants as a treatment for
Parkinson's disease. The plan is to transplant fetal tissue that
produces the neurotransmitter dopamine into the brains of
Parkinson's patients, in the hopes of alleviating the dopamine

deficit that afflicts them. Similar implants in the past have
produced mixed results. But the new $4.5 million study
involving 40 patients, is the largest, most ambitious study of
implants to date.

Dead Mothers and Living Babies
At noon on 5 October 1992, Marion Ploch, a dental assistant,
was on her way home from work. She was 13 weeks pregnant.
On the road she crashed her car against a tree. Because she was
suffering from a fractured skull, the young woman was taken
by helicopter to the university hospital in Erlanger where she
was treated in the intensive care unit. Her parents were
informed that Marion had no chance of survival. At first the
doctors wanted to get their approval for organ donation. Later
other doctors came with other views. They also regarded
Marion's situation as hopeless; however, on the evidence of
comparable cases in the literature they thought the fetus
would have a real chance of survival. At this time the doctors
sought the parents' agreement to keeping Marion coupled to
the apparatus that was maintaining her bodily functions. The
father of the child was unknown and did not appear in the days
following.
On 8 October the doctors confirmed that brain death had

occurred. but did not turn off the respirator. On 9 October,
Marion's parents sent a cry for help to a newspaper. Amid
emotional public discussion, the doctors did everything possible to keep the fetus alive. On 16 November, almost 6 weeks
after the diagnosis of brain death, the fetus was spontaneously
aborted. l

Unraveling Ethical Directions
It is not my intention to discuss any of the vignettes in
detail. I am far more concerned to discover what general
principles may be of assistance in directing us as we tackle
issues of this type. I shall endeavor, therefore, to paint with a
broad brush.
Deriving Good from Evil
We are prepared to benefit from tragedies, and this is
regarded as an ethically valid stance as long as we are in no way
responsible for the tragedies and if we would have prevented
them had we been in a position to do so.2 For instance, many
studies of malnourished children have thrown a great deal of
light on the effects of malnutrition on the developing brain,
while studies of the after effects of the atom bomb explosions
at Hiroshima and Nagasaki have proved of enormous value in
understanding the long term effects of radiation on human
populations. Moreover, Jewish doctors in the Warsaw ghetto
made systematic studies of their starving compatriots in order
to reap some scientific good from the evil that was destroying
them alP Recent studies of relevance in this context would
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include those on the brains of suicide victims in an attempt to
throw light on the pathogenesis of depression,4 and on fetuses
aborted for suspected fetal abnormality in order to determine
the accuracy of midtrimester diagnosis of fetal abnormality.s
The scientific studies have had as their aim increased
understanding of a range of pathologies. Under no circumstances has this desire for increased understanding lent legitimacy to the original acts; it has merely epitomized the possibility of benefiting from tragedies, and of deriving as much
good as possible from evil. The one proviso is that killing and
maiming are never undertaken in order to yield scientific data.
It was the lack of such a proviso that constituted the scandal of
the early days of modern anatomy, and the horror perpetrated
by the Nazis, although even here the retrospective use of such
data to benefit others is another issue.
As a result, we should not be surprised that cadavers may, on
occasion, be used to assist others in a variety of ways. This,
itself, is not unethical. Indeed, it may be associated with a
range of exceedingly worthy motives and actions. Nevertheless, even the possibility that the death of one may contribute
to life for another should be approached with caution, since the
highest of intentions may be taken advantage of for unworthy
ends, and the dying or dead may be exploited or simply
overlooked.
Moral Complicity: Can Good be Derivedfrom EvilP
Can the evil that led to the original death be disentangled
from the good that could result from it? For example, if
induced abortion is considered a moral evil, use of brain
material derived from the abortus for transplantation into a
patient with Parkinson's disease may itself be tainted with the
original evil. 6 According to the notion of moral complicity, the
benefit intended to be derived from use of this material
becomes no benefit at all, if there is no way of breaking the
thread of evil linking the two.
But is the theory of "moral complicity" too all-embracing a
notion? I would argue that it is. If human tissue from any
source is used, there is almost inevitably inadvertent involvement in some moral evil. It may be in the road toll when organs
are used from the victims of automobile accidents, in homicide
when organs are used from murder victims, in suicide when
organs are used from those who have committed suicide, or in
poverty when the cadavers of the destitute are used for
dissection. To suggest that the surgeon or anatomist is in a
supportive alliance with intoxicated car drivers, murderers,
those who commit suicide, or an inequitable social system,
bears little relationship to moral reality. There is a moral distance between the evil and the intended good.
Moral Values in the Use of Cadavers
Cadavers have both intrinsic and instrumental value. The
closest we come to recognizing a cadaver's intrinsic value, that
is, its worth, in and for itself, is when we argue that a person and
her body are more or less inseparable, and that the intrinsic
value of a living person is bestowed upon her cadaver at death.
We recognize each other because we recognize each other's
bodies, and while this applies supremely during life, some
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very important aspects of this identity continue following
death.
The instrumental value of a cadaver, that is, its use as a means
to an end, emerges when it is recognized as the source of
memories and responses. As we remember a person who has
died, we respect the person who was, and this leads to respect
for the person's remains. In addition, relatives and friends of
the deceased are now grieving the death, and the cadaver is an
integral part of the initial grieving process. The cadaver's
instrumental value is also evident when it serves as a source of
organs.
We respect a person-now-dead when account is taken of
that person's wishes when alive. Only in this way do we
recognize a continuum between the two, and hence the
cadaver's intrinsic value. Similarly, when account is taken of
the wishes and feelings of still-living relatives and friends, and
their relationships with the deceased, the cadaver's instrumental value is recognized.7
With respect to organ donation, the first moral value normally considered is that of autonomy, according to which, each
individual should have autonomous control over the disposition of his or her body after death, regardless of social need or
the public interest. s Donation implies that the people concerned made afree and informed decision prior to their death, to
allow their own bodies to serve as the source of transplanted
organs. In acting in this way, they are giving something more
closely identified than anything else with what they are and
represent. 9
This individual also has sets of relationships, and this brings
into focus a second set of moral values, that of the interests of
family members, who can in certain jurisdictions override the
wishes of the deceased. Whenever this occurs, it brings with
it an apparent clash of moral values-between the prior autonomy and interests of the deceased, and the actual autonomy and interests of the living.
Underlying these values is a premise that the giving of one's
body is preferable to being coerced into doing it. This is the
value of altruism, according to which it is better to give than to
receive, and the good of others is better than self-interest. lo
The gift element is central to this value, and from this perspective an opt-in scheme for organ donation is preferable to an
opt-out scheme that lacks altruistic intentions, since an organ
is taken without permission and the person concerned is
unable to defend his or her bodily integrity.
A further value stems from a common response, namely,
that death, especially when premature or unexpected, is tragic.
Some people may find solace and meaning in the use of body
parts to assist others. This is the redemptive aspect of organ
donations.
Tragedy and injustice can be transformed by redemptive
actions. Death for one may usher in life for another, although
the manner in which this is accomplished takes us to the heart
of ethical discourse. Integral to the values I have sketched is
an ideal enshrining the autonomy, decision-making capaciHies, relationships, and family interests of both the deceased
-and the living. When these values are recognized, altruism
emerges as foundational. With this framework, the inequities
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of many situations and the unethical nature of others can begin
to be addressed.
With this in mind, I shall turn to a fourth vignette.

Transforming Diseased Lives Using New Genes
Almost nine months before she was born, Brittany Nicole
Abshire passed the most important test she will ever take. Her
parents, Renee and David, are both healthy carriers of the trait
for Tay-Sachs disease. After they lost one daughter to TaySachs in 1989, they swore they would never have another child
unless they could be sure it would be free of the disease.
Genetic tests could diagnose the condition before birth, but
the Abshires' religious beliefs ruled out abortion as a way of
screening for healthy fetuses.
There seemed to be no hope until the Abshires learned
about a new technology called preimplantation genetic testing. The experimental procedure had already been used to
screen more than a dozen children for cystic fibrosis. Ova and
sperm were collected from the Abshires and several ova were
successfully fertilized in vitro. After three days and with the
embryos at the eight-cell stage, one cell was removed and its
DNA was analyzed.
For four of the embryos, the analysis worked: one of them
showed the combination of genes responsible for Tay-Sachs
disease, whereas the remaining three were not even carriers.
These three embryos were implanted in Renee, and one
survived to become Brittany, who was born in January, 1994.
Courtesy of genetic testing, Brittany is the first child ever
certified to be free of Tay-Sachs disease before entering her
mother's womb. ll
Precise Control
One might be tempted to argue that, in this case, there is
only a good: the elimination of a deleterious gene and hence
the disease produced by that gene. A healthy person is born
rather than a diseased one. Nevertheless, this has been
accomplished by eliminating embryos that could have developed further and may have given rise to living human persons,
and also by a considerable degree of control over prenatal
existence. While other forms of gene therapy raise different
issues, dependence upon a major degree of control over the
constitution of future individuals is always present. l2
This prompts fears that technology is out of control and is
subverting the human condition, enslaving human beings, and
mocking all they stand for as individuals created by God, with
higher purposes, and with responsibilities for themselves, for
others, and for their world.
Playing God
Surprising as it may seem, a theological perspective does
not of necessity support these contentions, since humans are
made in God's image, and so in some of our attributes we are
to function like God.13 Regardless of how much our Godlikeness has been shattered by sin and rebellion, we remain
images of our maker, albeit tarnished images. As such, we
demonstrate a great deal of his creativity and inquisitiveness.
Consequently, humans as scientists are humans as God's
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images, probing and thrusting into the creation, attempting to
understand it and make it accountable to God's stewards.
Within the medical sphere, the desire is to exercise at least
limited control over evil in the form of disease, disease that
would ravish and destroy all that is beautiful and worthy in
God's world. 14
Consequently, genetic advance per se is not synonymous
with pride and arrogance; in no way does it amount to the aping
of God's power, since gene therapy owes its rationale to this
power. As long as the aim of gene therapy is the alleviation of
human illness, it has the potential to elevate God's images.
This is where therapeutic interventions fit in. By contrast, the
attempt to create some new creature with superlative powers
would be to play God in a pejorative sense, since it would stem
from human conceit regarding the all-too-limited nature of
human ability and human wisdom. A more balanced view is
that playing God should remind us that we tamper with
fundamental biological processes only with caution and great
humility; there is much we do not know, and there is much
over which we have only perfunctory control. We are to play
God, but we are to do it with intelligence and compassion.

Tinkering with Nature
Genetic technology is frequently considered to go further
than playing God-to be actually interfering with nature. IS It
is difficult to see how genetic technology per se does this.
Nature has given us genetic combinations that lead to TaySachs disease, diabetes, and heart disease, but few would
argue that these particular combinations constitute a good.
Medicine has traditionally done its best to cope with genetic
conditions, and these have not, in and of themselves, been
regarded as transgressing the boundary oflicit human endeavor.
Humans have intruded into nature throughout recorded human history, whether it has been by draining swamps infested
with malaria-bearing mosquitoes or by using antibiotics. 16 It
is far more important to ask whether the intrusions enhance or
diminish the human condition.
Within a Christian context, we may also ask whether they
enhance or diminish our ability to respond to God and to
appreciate the world He has brought into being and sustains.
Nature is not to be worshipped as if it were some unchanging
given; neither is the human genome to be elevated to some
untouchable status as if it were fixed and immutable)7 Humans have been given stewardship of the created order,
including the human genome. What is required is that we
determine the sort of interference with nature and the genome
that will advance human welfare, while respecting the dimensions of what it means to be human. This requires a great deal
of enlightened ethical discernment, and an awareness of the
tentative path along which we are travelling. 18
Slippery Slope
It may still be objected that gene therapy (for instance,
preimplantation genetic testing, or somatic cell gene therapy)
is unethical since it represents the beginning of a slippery slope,
the inevitable end result of which will be germ line gene
therapy and eugenics. But is this progression inevitable?
4

Implicit within the slippery slope argument is the assumption
that permission to allow one kind of intervention holds for all
kinds of intervention. However, this is not the case in moral
reasoning, where there is an immense gulf between different
sorts of measures. For instance, there is a considerable moral
chasm between gene therapy to treat disease (such as cancer
or heart disease) and gene manipulation to alter behavior or
morality. 19 This is the boundary between the world of therapy
and the alleviation of disease on the one hand, and eugenics
and enhancement on the other; and it is a boundary where
there is a logical and moral stop sign. 20 Any ethical approach
to gene therapy in general has to maintain that gulf and the
moral world enshrined by it.
The additional move to genetic enhancement and eugenics
is a move from the world of finding cures to diseases that kill
and disfigure and that limit basic human capacities, to a world
of ideal is tic attempts to perfect the human species and improve
fundamental human attributes. 21 Once we moved into this
latter world we would have placed ourselves on a slippery
slope towards perfectibility and manipulation. 22 But that is
not where we are at the moment, and that is not where any
serious geneticist or ethicist would wish us to be.
Some Christians are unhappy with this sentiment, on the
ground that sinful humans cannot be trusted to act responsibly.23 Nevertheless, we do act in these ways in many other
dangerous areas, whether these be the use of motor vehicles,
or of tranquilizers, or of nuclear power. In none of these areas
can humans be trusted as much as we would like, but reflections of God's image still remain and often restrain the more
extreme actions of which humans are capable. Nonetheless,
the genetic realm is a potentially dangerous one, and this is a
salutary reminder to all who would indulge in its possible
excesses.

Ambiguity
Genetic knowledge confronts us in a poignant way with
ambiguity. On the one hand, we want to know all; our curiosity
drives us to search and to keep on searching. 24 Genetics shows
us much about why we are as we are, but it also enables us to
know something about what we will be like in the future. And
it is this ability to look into the future and control what may
happen in the future that is so alluring. But is it too alluring?
Are we afraid of too much self knowledge?
Alongside this ambiguity goes another-the prospect of
greatly increased control over people's lives and all pervasive
intervention in their lives. Such control and intervention may be
used exclusively for good, but there is always the prospect that
this may not be the case, and we recoil from this prospect. This
is ambiguity once again; we may be able to control others, but
they equally will be able to control us, and may not do it with
the best of intentions.
Tension between Perfection and Imperfection
Alongside this perspective stands another: the tension
between perfection and imperfection. Some grand genetic
vistas allude to perfectibility, improving humans in unspecified ways,2S and while such vistas are not on any current

Update Volume 11, Number 4

genetic agendas, they feed the imagination nonetheless. But
even in the imaginary realm, we are forced to ask whether we
really want perfection, with its message that challenges will be
no more? Do we really want total genetic control? Surely such
a picture is the complete antithesis of all that human existence
means, so that too much genetic control challenges our conception of what it means to be human: we may lose our self
identity in the process. 26
This is an issue of fundamental concern to Christians,
although I would add it does not inevitably lead in an antitechnology direction. What it does usher in is serious moral
reflection about how we can enhance and substantiate our
humanity, as people created in the image and likeness of God,
and living within the domain of God's grace and the hope
enshrined by that grace. 27
In order to illustrate the importance of serious moral reflection, I shall return to the present, and to an area replete with
savage moral perplexity: the ever increasing domain of the
agmg.

life seriously and living it passionately? To number our days
is the condition for making them count, to treasure and appreciate all that life brings."29
A longing for human immortality is a longing for more of the
same. By contrast, the Christian view seeks to redirect our
goals and longings towards God and away from ourselves. It is
a transformation of all we have ever been, even if it builds in
some way on our responses and priorities during this life. It
heals our present estrangement from God in a fundamentally
more radical way than anything possible in this present existence, and it will bring fulfillment, wholeness and completeness of a sort only barely discernible now. Such immortality
has no connection with the longing for a prolonged earthly life,
which cannot possibly begin to satisfy our deepest aspirations.
Using a different approach, Hans Jonas 30 reaches a similar
conclusion when he writes:
"We are finite beings and even if our vital functions continued without impairment, there are limits to what our brains can
store and keep adding to. It is the mental side of our being that
sooner or later must call a halt even if the magicians of

A Final Vignette
Too Old and Too Costly
There is no end to the possibility of spending money to
combat the inevitable biological decline and death inherent in
aging. Unless curbed, therefore, a curative bias will effectively
consume a disproportionate share of resources as it pushes
forward the frontiers of life extension, a frontier that is in the
nature of the case open and endless.
That is also an attitude that effectively works to rob old age
of meaning, though this has yet to be sufficiently noticed. Its
implicit premise is that the only meaningful old age is one that
places the highest priority on averting death, not on marshaling our resources to help make old age a time of completion
and enrichment.

The Blessing of Mortality
Leon Kass has argued that: "The attachment to life-or the
fear of death-knows no limits, certainly not for most human
beings. It turns out that the simple answer is best: we want to
live and live, and not to wither and not to die."28 Alternatively,
one may have more modest aims: not adding years to life, but
life to years. This looks to a time when all who are alive, or at
least the lucky ones in the lucky countries, will know increased health, increased vigor, and an absence of decay or
dementia, until the day of one's death. And yet even here
there may be a problem. Within such a scenario, death would
seem even more shocking than it does now.
Perhaps both these approaches are misleading, because
they fail to acknowledge the Christian conception of the
"fall." In their different ways, both approaches attempt to
escape the all pervading effects of the evil that permeates
everything we touch or experience. They are of little help in
sorting out ethical issues of significance in coping with the
aged and demented, since they are attempting to escape from
Iging and its consequences. It may be better to start from the
premise that mortality is a blessing. Leon Kass has asked the
question: "Is not the limit on our time the ground of our taking
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biotechnology invent tricks for keeping the body machine
going indefinitely. Old age, in humans, means a long past,
which the mind must accommodate in its present as the substratum of personal identity . .. we could go on interminably only
at the price of either losing the past and therewith our real
identity, or living only in the past and therefore without a real
present ... this would leave us stranded in a world we no longer
understand even as spectators, walking anachronisms who
have outlived themselves."31
The implications of these approaches are considerable,
since once we acknowledge and accept our finitude, we can
devote our attention to living well and establishing important
priorities for both ourselves and others. This, in turn, should
serve as a powerful directive when treating others and determining health care priorities. This is also a directive with
Christian underpinnings, as we seek to redeem the time, to be
holy, to devote ourselves to the service of others, and to live as
though we will meet Christ today.

Toward a Synthesis
The vignettes were selected to demonstrate a range of
beneficiaries and a range of donors. Where do we go in the light
of problems such as these?
Human Dignity
My starting point is that all human beings are to be viewed
as having an inalienable dignity, stemming from our creation by
God and revealed supremely in the redemption made possible
by Christ. It rests not on what human beings can accomplish
in material, social or spiritual terms, but on the rock of God's
10ve. 32 Consequently, human dignity is always based on what
individuals are in the sight of God and never on what they may
be able to do for society, for mankind, or even for God. From
this it follows that those who are of no functional value to
society still retain a dignity, since they remain important in the
sight and purposes of God. Elements of this dignity are also to
be found in those who have now died, but a short time ago were
one of us. In a somewhat different way, elements of this
dignity attach to human fetuses, since they have a high chance
of becoming one of us. The dignity of human beings, therefore,
to some degree encompasses and characterizes fetuses and
cadavers.
The theological notion of human dignity is implicit within
notions of servanthood, by which we give ourselves for others,
serving them in a self-sacrificial way, and putting their interests before our own. Such a life-style finds its warrant in the
worth of others, and in the claims others make upon us because
they are so like us and because they are of such value in the
sight of God. In theological terms, these "others" are not
simply our friends and those who will repay us fully for our
concern, but they include our enemies, those unable to protect
their own interests, and those on the borders of human
personhood.
Neighborliness
All human beings should be valued, but all human beings
cannot be of equal value to me-in the sense that I am obligated
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to serve and help those in question. I am still to feel at one with
all humanity, but I cannot rescue all humanity however much
I may wish to do so. I am never to close my eyes to those in
need-after all, whenever I see need about which I could do"
something, that human being fits into what I have described
as neighbor. I have responsibility for all such people.
A point may come where invidious choices have to be made,
and where all courses of action will involve loss and suffering.
When this is the case, the lesser of the two evils is the course
to be adopted. Unfortunately, under such circumstances
human dignity will be sacrificed whichever course is followed.
At this point of unavoidable tension, knowingly and very
regrettably, the value to be ascribed to some human beings will
have to be overridden. There is a differential, since there are
limits. However, any course of action that downgrades or
ignores human value (in the broader sense) is never the course
of choice, but reflects the plight of humans in a suffering world.
Relatedness Rather than Namelessness
People become nameless when no one cares about them.
This transformation into namelessness occurs, as I have indicated, in tragedies of huge magnitude, and yet it is also found
in families, societies, hospitals, and health care situations.
Namelessness is a frequent accompaniment of illness. As
dignity is lost through illness, especially when the illness is
debilitating and catastrophic, enormous effort is required to
maintain personhood and status. Namelessness may occur
when adult and fetal cadavers are treated as little more than
organ farms, when fetuses are regarded as impediments to an
upwardly mobile lifestyle, when the demented aging are little
more than expensive and unwanted byproducts of high technology medicine, and when infants are brought into the world
to serve the medical needs of others. Relationships break
down for the nameless ones, since relationships with a nameless
individual cease to be meaningful. The nameless rapidly
become relatedless, the antithesis of any moral evaluation that
wishes to bestow dignity, hope and meaning on human beings
as people made in the image and likeness of God.
Humility
In the last analysis the health professional should be characterized by humility. This is the religious sense of our dependence on God, in which we recognize that we are not our own,
but belong to God to be used according to His purposes. Allen
Verhey has argued that humility in this sense is not fatalism; "it
does not deny the brokenness of our world or of [some people's
bodies] ... it does not glibly identify automobile accidents
with God's intentions. It does not call for an end to passion, it
calls rather for us to share the passion of Christ. It disposes
persons to bear the brokenness, sadness, and tragedy of our
world in hope and faith and 10ve."33
Technology, per se, will never eliminate suffering and
tragedy; neither will it create hope. The quality of human lives
comes from our recognition of our place in God's world, our
willingness to learn from Him, and our ability to grow in
wisdom and understanding. Only in this way will human
values and human society be enriched.
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Ambiguous Presences
The values I have just enunciated are nothing more than a
beginning as we come to terms with what I refer to as
\ambiguous presences." They will not solve the specific
dilemmas I have laid before you, and they are not intended to
do so. Rather, they serve the important role of providing a
paradigm based on the dignity of human beings, our role as
neighbors, and the crucial importance of ensuring as far as
possible that those with ambiguous presences are treated in
ways that recognize and build on their relatedness.
The ambiguous presences I have alluded to have included
adult and fetal corpses required as sources of transplanted
organs, embryos detected as carriers of certain deleterious
genes, a dead pregnant woman as the receptacle for a growing
fetus, and the elderly when exposed to the possibilities of
expensive high technology medicine. Note that it is the
context that renders these various individuals and groups
ambiguous presences. It is the context that imposes the
ambiguity and necessitates decision making. This should
come as no surprise. Ambiguity is at the core of the human
context, accentuated as it is by the successes and failures of
biomedical technology. And ambiguity is essential to the
human condition. It makes us view with seriousness the larger
picture, forces us to ask deeper questions, and confronts us
with profound theological issues. Unless we ensure that
human values are central to this debate, they will be overwhelmed by dubious priorities and ill conceived technological endeavors. But this need not be so, and I hope this lecture
.las demonstrated both the grounds of my hope, and some
'pointers to a way forward.
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